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I. WHAT IS A CYBER WEAPON? 
 
  
      entral to the conduct of hostilities in an armed conflict are the tools 
and techniques with which the fight is undertaken. In non-cyber warfare, 
the tools, that is, the missiles, bombs, rifles, bayonets, mines, bullets and 
other weapons and associated equipment, are employed in ways that differ 
according to the military purpose that it is being sought after. These twin 
ideas of “military tools” and of the ways in which they are employed can be 
applied equally to cyber warfare. It follows that we should consider how 
the law that regulates, respectively, the tools or means of warfare and the 
ways or methods whereby those tools are used should properly be applied 
in the cyber context. 
Any discussion of cyber methods and means of warfare should take as 
its starting point the more general notion of means and methods of war-
fare. Means of warfare consist of all weapons, weapons platforms and as-
sociated equipment used directly to deliver force during hostilities. Meth-
ods of warfare consist of the ways in which weapons are used in hostilities.  
Weapons are devices, munitions, implements, substances, objects or 
pieces of equipment which generate an offensive capability that can be ap-
                                                                                                                      












plied to an enemy person or object.1 The Manual on the Law of Air and Mis-
sile Warfare (AMW Manual) defines the term “weapon” as “a means of war-
fare used in combat operations, including a gun, missile, bomb or other 
munitions, that is capable of causing either (i) injury to, or death of, per-
sons; or (ii) damage to, or destruction of, objects.”2 The accompanying 
commentary makes the point that the force used need not be kinetic, citing 
the effects produced by certain computer network operations.3 In its Glos-
sary of Military Terms, the U.S. Department of Defense defines a weapon 
system as “[a] combination of one or more weapons with all related 
equipment, materials, services, personnel, and means of delivery or de-
ployment (if applicable) required for self-sufficiency.”4 The AMW Manual 
characterizes “means of warfare” as “weapons, weapon systems or plat-
forms employed for the purposes of attack”5 with the result that means of 
warfare involves not just weapon systems, but also equipment used to con-
trol, facilitate or direct the conduct of hostilities.6 
Weapons as conventionally understood can take a variety of forms. 
While some weapons, such as bombs, rockets, bullets, artillery shells and 
the like generate their destructive effect by the use of kinetic force, other 
kinds of weapons, such as gases, chemical and biological agents achieve 
                                                                                                                      
1. WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 4, 344 
(2009). 
2. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, MANUAL ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE rule 1(ff) (2009). The 
Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University (HPCR) 
convened a group of international legal experts to review and restate the existing law of air 
and missile warfare. At the end of a multi-year process HPCR published the Manual on 
International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare, which contains the black-letter rules 
reflecting the overall consensus of the legal experts of the existing law of international 
armed conflict bearing on air and missile warfare. HPCR also published the COMMEN-
TARY ON THE HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MIS-
SILE WARFARE (2010) [hereinafter AMW COMMENTARY]. In the Commentary each Black-
letter Rule is accompanied by a commentary intended to provide explanations of the rule. 
For ease of citation, citations in this article will be to the Commentary since it contains both 
the rules and their associated commentary.  
3. AMW COMMENTARY, supra note 2, rule 1(ff) cmt. ¶ 1, at 55. 
4. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and As-
sociated Terms (Nov. 8, 2010), as amended through July 15, 2012, http://www. 
dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. 
5. AMW COMMENTARY, supra note 2, rule 1(t), at 41. 













their wounding or deadly purpose without necessarily operating kinetically.7 
The critical factor in relation to all weapons is the injurious or damaging 
effect that they have on the persons and/or objects associated with the ad-
verse party to the conflict. 
Applying these notions in the cyber domain, the immediate question is 
how a cyber capability resident, for example, on a thumb drive that is re-
leased by simply pressing the “enter” key can possibly be described as an 
offensive capability, thus, potentially, as a cyber weapon. As Professor 
Schmitt has pointed out, it is the violent consequences that are designed or 
intended to follow the use of the cyber capability that are critical to the 
characterization of such a cyber event as a cyber attack. The same intended 
violent consequences are critical to the characterization of a cyber capabil-
ity as a cyber weapon.8 Therefore, a cyber weapon would comprise any 
computer equipment or computer device that is designed, intended or 
used, in order to have violent consequences, that is, to cause death or inju-
ry to persons or damage or destruction of objects.  
“Object” denotes any physical object, such as a piece of computing 
equipment. If the cyber capability burns out components in the targeted 
computer system, the requirement as to damage will be satisfied. Equally, 
the effect of the cyber capability on the facility which the targeted comput-
er serves may render the capability a cyber weapon. For example, the object 
against which the cyber operation is directed is the supervisory control and 
data acquisition system that controls the operation of a public utility instal-
lation, such as a water treatment works, or, a similar computer system that 
controls a production process, such as at an oil refinery. In these cases the 
damage that is caused by the cyber operation to the water treatment instal-
lation or to the oil refinery will also cause the cyber tool to be considered a 
cyber weapon.  
The next question is whether damage to data within a computer system 
that does not affect the facility or service that the targeted computer system 
provides constitutes damage for these purposes. In other words, is the data 
resident in the target computer system to be regarded as an object? The 
author’s view is that such data only becomes an “object” when it is critical 
                                                                                                                      
7. While it is well appreciated that the listed weapons are generally prohibited by trea-
ty, it is the fact that they are nevertheless widely recognized as weapons that is critical here. 
8. Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello: Key Issues, in INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF WAR 89, 93–94 (Raul A. “Pete” Ped-













to the operation of the targeted system.9 If as a result the targeted comput-
er ceases to perform the required control function causing, in our exam-
ples, water purification or oil refining to cease, this would amount to dam-
age if repairs are needed before production can resume. A cyber tool being 
used for such a purpose would, therefore, be a cyber weapon. Temporary 
shutdown causing inconvenience or irritation would not amount to damage 
or injury, and use of a cyber tool to cause those results would not cause it 
to be regarded as a cyber weapon.10 
If, in considering these principles, we conclude that a particular cyber 
tool has an offensive capability, the remaining issue is whether it can 
properly be described as “applied” to an enemy person or object. There is 
an inherent indirectness about cyber activity in which there are often nu-
merous orders of effect. The first order of effect is the direct impact of the 
cyber activity on the data in the targeted computer. That produces the sec-
ond order effect by affecting the service the target computer provides. The 
resulting damage, injury and other consequences that the termination or 
interruptions of service cause to the customers of the targeted computer 
system constitute third order effects, which may well have been the main 
purpose in undertaking the cyber operation. Computer linkages and cus-
tomer dependencies taken together comprise the mechanism that is being 
exploited to apply the offensive cyber capability—or cyber tool—to the 
targeted object or person. Indeed, that cyber tool can properly be regarded 
as applied to all of the devices, data, objects and persons within this chain 
of effect. 
We can therefore properly conclude that computers, computer data 
and associated mechanisms that are capable of generating any of these or-
ders of effect on an adverse party to the conflict are capable of being a 
cyber weapon. Such computers, data or mechanisms will only actually be-
come a cyber weapon, however, if they are used, designed or intended to 
be used for such purposes.11 
                                                                                                                      
9. See also TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
WARFARE rule 38 cmt. ¶ 5 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL].  
10. For a discussion of these issues in relation to the notion of cyber attack, see KNUT 
DÖRMANN, APPLICABILITY OF THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS TO COMPUTER NETWORK 
ATTACKS 6 (2004), available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/ 
68lg92?opendocument (paper delivered at the International Expert Conference on Com-
puter Network Attacks and the Applicability of International Humanitarian Law, Stock-
holm); Schmitt, supra note 8, at 95. 
11. A distinction must therefore be drawn between the use of cyber capabilities for 













II. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF WEAPONS LAW 
 
The customary, fundamental principles and established rules of weapons 
law apply to cyber weapons no less than any other weapons. As the Inter-
national Court of Justice observed in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion,  
 
the intrinsically humanitarian character [of the established principles and 
rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict] permeates the en-
tire law of armed conflict and applies to all forms of warfare and to all 
kinds of weapons, those of the past, those of the present and those of the 
future.12 
 
There are three customary principles of weapons law. The first is that 
the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of 
warfare is not unlimited.13 This means that those involved in undertaking 
cyber operations during armed conflicts have a clear legal duty to “respect 
the rules of international law applicable in case of armed conflict.”14  
By the second customary principle, it is “prohibited to employ weap-
ons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.”15 The injury and suffering to 
                                                                                                                      
for information gathering or espionage. While a cyber capability may be capable of gener-
ating the stated orders of effect, thereby causing death, injury, damage or destruction, it is 
only if it is used to cause these things that it will become a weapon. While the logic leading 
to this conclusion seems to the author to be inescapable, consider, however, the valid is-
sues raised in Duncan Blake & Joseph S. Imburgia, Bloodless Weapons? The Need to Conduct 
Legal Reviews of Certain Capabilities and the Implications of Defining Them as “Weapons,” 66 AIR 
FORCE LAW REVIEW 157 (2010). 
12 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, ¶ 86 (July 8), reprinted in 35 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 809 (1996). 
13. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 35(1), June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. 
14. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GE-
NEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 1404 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & 
Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987). Note also the Martens clause at Additional Protocol I, 
art. 1(2), supra note 13 (“In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international 
agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the 
principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of 
humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.”).  
15. Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 35(2). The original U.S. Department of 
Defense weapons review directive was prepared by Edward R. Cummings, Waldemar A. 
Solf and Harry Almond. They included in the document what the author regards as the 












be assessed in the case of cyber weapons is that expected under each of the 
orders of effect that were described in the previous section. In applying 
this rule, the legitimacy of a cyber weapon must be assessed “by comparing 
the nature and scale of the generic military advantage to be anticipated 
from the weapon in the application for which it is designed to be used with 
the pattern of injury and suffering associated with the normal, intended use 
of the weapon.”16 The references to the generic nature of the military ad-
vantage and to the injury and suffering associated with normal use make 
the point that this test is mainly concerned with the generality of such as-
pects and not with the circumstances on a particular occasion. It is the 
qualities of the weapon per se, rather than the particularities of a specific 
attack, with which the weapons law test is usually concerned. If, however, 
as will frequently be the case, a cyber weapon is being prepared or pro-
cured in order to be used on a known occasion against a specified target, 
the ad hoc circumstances must be carefully considered when determining 
whether the superfluous injury/unnecessary suffering test is satisfied.17 
                                                                                                                      
test currently available. The test is lengthy but is reproduced here because of its clarity and 
relevance.  
 
The prohibition of unnecessary suffering constitutes acknowledgment that necessary suf-
fering to combatants is lawful, and may include severe injury or loss of life. There is no 
agreed international definition for unnecessary suffering. A weapon or munition would be 
deemed to cause unnecessary suffering only if it inevitably or in its normal use has a par-
ticular effect and the injury caused is considered by governments as disproportionate to 
the military necessity for it, that is, the military advantage to be gained from its use. This 
balancing test cannot be conducted in isolation. A weapon’s or munition’s effects must be 
weighed in light of comparable, lawful weapons or munitions in use on the modern battle-
field. A weapon is not unlawful merely because it may cause severe suffering or injury. 
The appropriate determination is whether a weapon’s or munition’s employment for its 
normal or expected use would be prohibited under some or all circumstances. The correct 
criterion is whether the employment of a weapon for its normal or expected use inevitably 
would cause injury or suffering manifestly disproportionate to its military effectiveness. 
 
This text is reproduced in W. Hays Parks, Means and Methods of Warfare, 38 GEORGE 
WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 511, 517 n.25 (2006). See also MICHAEL 
BOTHE, KARL JOSEF PARTSCH & WALDEMAR A. SOLF, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF 
ARMED CONFLICTS, COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE 
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 200–201 (1982). 
16. William J. Fenrick, The Conventional Weapons Convention: A Modest but Useful Treaty, 
279 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 498, 500 (1990); BOOTHBY, supra note 
1, at 63. 
17. Accordingly, when a cyber weapon is being developed for use against a known 
target, it is the injury to persons that is to be expected as a result of the way it is to be used 
on that occasion against the intended target that must be compared with alternative meth-













The third customary principle of weapons law is that it is prohibited to 
employ weapons, means or methods of warfare, including cyber weapons, 
which are indiscriminate by nature. This rule, derived from Article 51(4) of 
the 1977 Additional Protocol I (AP I) to the four 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions, has customary law status, thus binding all States.18 If the cyber weap-
on cannot be directed at a particular military objective or if its effects can-
not be controlled, it will likely breach this weapons law part of the discrim-
ination rule.19  
This rule would seem to be particularly relevant to cyber weapons. 
Thus, if the characteristics of a piece of cyber malware are such that it will 
cause damage to the target computer system, but also infect and damage 
numerous other civilian computer systems or websites, the cyber weapon 
may be indiscriminate by nature and prohibited by the rule. The critical is-
sue here is whether the cyber weapon not only engages the intended target, 
but also reasonably limits its damaging effect to that intended target. 
An attack that breaches the proportionality rule in Article 51(5)(b) of 
AP I is an example of an attack that would breach the indiscriminate at-
tacks prohibition.20 In the cyber context, it will not be the only example. 
                                                                                                                      
weapon, means or method of warfare is of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnec-
essary suffering.  
18. Having noted that indiscriminate attacks are prohibited, the paragraph so far as 
relevant, defines indiscriminate attacks as  
 
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a spe-
cific military objective; or (c) those which employ a method or means of combat the ef-
fects of which cannot be limited as required by [the] Protocol; and consequently, in each 
such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects with-
out distinction.  
 
Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 51(4). The V2 rockets used by Germany towards 
the end of World War II are the sort of weapon that would have breached this rule. 
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 14, ¶ 1958. On the rule gen-
erally, see Michael N. Schmitt, Future War and the Principle of Discrimination, 28 ISRAEL 
YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 51, 55 (1998).  
19. The UK Manual observes, “It is prohibited to employ weapons which cannot be 
directed at a specific military objective or the effect of which cannot be limited as required 
by Additional Protocol 1 and consequently are of a nature to strike military objectives and 
civilians or civilian objects without distinction.” UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DE-
FENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 6.4 (2004) [hereinafter UK 
MANUAL]. 
20. Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I provides that the following type of attack 
is to be considered indiscriminate, namely an attack “which may be expected to cause in-












Other examples may include worms, viruses and other malware whose na-
ture is to spread their effects uncontrollably, and cyber malware that, 
though it is designed to attack only the targeted computer node, is also of a 
nature to cause incidental second and/or third order damage to civilian us-
ers21 of the target computer system, including those who may not neces-
sarily be known to the targeteer.  
The execution of discriminating cyber attacks therefore presupposes 
that the weapon system to be employed is capable of reasonably limiting its 
effects to the target computer system and to the targeted customers of that 
system. This is the first matter to consider when determining whether the 
cyber weapon is indiscriminate by nature. If it passes that test, the planned 
operational procedures must adequately inform the assessment whether 
any particular planned attack will be discriminating. Information will be 
required as to the target system, its linkages, its dependencies and its cus-
tomers and as to the customers of any linked system that is also liable to be 
affected by planned cyber attacks. Planning such attacks will place consid-
erable demands on intelligence resources. Additionally, as will be addressed 
in the weapons review section below, the reviewer conducting the required 
legal review will wish to be satisfied that the broader context in which the 
cyber weapon will be used is not such as to render its nature indiscriminate. 
 
III. SPECIFIC WEAPONS LAW RULES OF RELEVANCE TO CYBER WEAPONS 
 
Some of the technology-specific weapons law rules would seem to be of 
particular potential relevance to cyber warfare; these are discussed in this 
section.  
Two sets of rules protect the natural environment during armed con-
flict. Article 35(3) of AP I prohibits the employment of “methods or means 
of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, 
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.”22 By contrast, 
                                                                                                                      
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated.” 
21. The word “users” is here intended to include not only persons but systems or ob-
jects that would suffer injury, death, damage or destruction.  
22. Note that Article 55 of Additional Protocol I additionally requires that care be 
taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and 
severe damage, such protection to include a prohibition “of the use of methods or means 
of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural 













the 1976 UN Environmental Modification Convention23 addresses the use 
of the environment as a weapon. Its core provision is an undertaking by 
States party “not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environ-
mental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe 
effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other state par-
ty.”24 The Convention defines “environmental modification techniques as 
“any technique for changing—through the deliberate manipulation of natu-
ral processes—the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, includ-
ing its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer 
space.”25 
The effect of these rules is that any cyber weapon, the second and third 
order effects of which can be expected to be widespread, long-term and 
severe damage to the natural environment, will be prohibited and should 
not be used. Equally, the use of cyber methods alone, or perhaps more 
likely in association with the use of a conventional weapon or substance of 
some type, to achieve the defined forms of environmental modification 
and which cause injury, damage or destruction to an opposing party to the 
conflict is also prohibited. A cyber weapon designed to cause the core of a 
nuclear electricity generating station to ignite, thereby spreading high levels 
of long-lasting nuclear contamination that renders wide areas of surround-
ing territory uninhabitable for very protracted periods, is likely to be an ex-
ample of a cyber weapon that would breach the AP I rule.  
The use of poisons, poisoned weapons and asphyxiating gases is pro-
hibited at customary law and by treaty provision.26 Biological weapons are 
                                                                                                                      
23. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinafter 
ENMOD Convention] For a discussion of ENMOD, see Arthur H. Westing, The Envi-
ronmental Modification Convention of 1977—Reflections in Anticipation of the Second Review Confer-
ence, 5 HUMANITÄRES VÖLKERRECHT INFORMATIONSSCHRIFTEN 70 (1992); ENVIRON-
MENTAL WARFARE: A TECHNICAL, LEGAL AND POLICY APPRAISAL (Arthur H. Westing 
ed., 1984); Jozef Goldblat, The ENMOD Convention: A Critical Review, 2 HUMANITÄRES 
VÖLKERRECHT INFORMATIONSSCHRIFTEN 82 (1993). 
24. ENMOD Convention, supra note 23, art. I(1).  
25. Id., art. II(1). 
26. The customary prohibition on the use of poison and poisoned weapons is reflect-
ed in Article 23(a) of the 1907 Hague Regulations. Regulations Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Cus-
toms of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227. See also UK MANUAL, supra note 19, ¶ 
6.19.1; 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW rule 72 (Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005). The prohibition of the use of asphyxiat-












prohibited by the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention27 and chemical 
weapons are prohibited by the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention.28 The 
possession or use of biological weapons is, in the author’s view, prohibited 
by customary law, while the prohibition on use of chemical weapons is fast 
becoming a customary rule, if indeed it has not already achieved that sta-
tus.29 A cyber weapon will not generally have the nature of a poison, gas, 
chemical or biological weapon. However, cyber operations may enable a 
party to the conflict to gain effective control over such weapons or sub-
stances from an adverse party to the conflict. If a State’s use of cyber 
methods results in it gaining control of poisons, poisoned weapons, as-
phyxiating gas, chemical weapons or biological weapons from an opposing 
party, it may not employ cyber or other methods to use such weapons or 
substances in connection with the armed conflict. It must take action to 
safeguard and, in the case of chemical and biological weapons, to destroy 
them to the extent that its degree of control and other factors enable it 
practically to do so.30 
Protocols adopted under the aegis of the Convention on Certain Con-
ventional Weapons (CCW)31 address a number of classes of weapon. Pro-
tocol I prohibits weapons “the primary effect of which is to injure by 
fragments which in the human body escape detection by X-rays.”32 It 
                                                                                                                      
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gas-
es, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, reprinted in 14 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 49 (1975). 
27. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling 
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Apr. 10, 
1972, 26. U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Biological Weapons Convention]. 
For a discussion of the convention, see Josef Goldblat, The Biological Weapons Convention—
An Overview, 318 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 251 (1997). 
28. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45. 
29. See discussion in BOOTHBY, supra note 1, at 129, 137. 
30. Note that the destruction obligations in the Biological Weapons Convention ex-
tend to weapons that a State party to the treaty possesses or controls. Biological Weapons 
Convention, supra note 27, art. II. It will be a matter of interpretation whether cyber oper-
ations have the effect of placing chemical or biological weapons under the control of a 
State party to the relevant Convention. If they do have that effect, the obligations in the 
relevant Convention addressed to a State having control of such a weapon must be con-
sidered. 
31. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate 
Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137. 













would seem most unlikely that a cyber weapon would be designed or in-
tended to have a second or third order effect of releasing a weapon with 
such characteristics. Protocol II and the amended version of the Protocol 
will be considered below. Protocol III33 imposes prohibitions and re-
strictions on the use of incendiary weapons as defined in Article 1 of the 
Protocol. It is prohibited to make a military objective located within a con-
centration of civilians the object of attack by air-delivered incendiary weap-
ons. A similarly located military objective may only be made the object of 
attack by a non-air-delivered incendiary weapon if the military objective is 
clearly separated from the concentration of civilians, and all feasible pre-
cautions are taken to limit the incendiary effects to the military objective 
and avoid or minimize incidental civilian injury and loss.  
Protocol IV34 to the CCW prohibits laser weapons specifically designed 
as one of their combat functions to cause permanent blindness to unen-
hanced vision.35 If a laser weapon has the potential to cause such blindness, 
it would be unlawful to use in conjunction with that weapon a cyber tool 
that is intentionally designed to cause permanent blindness. For example, a 
cyber tool designed to direct the laser beam towards the line of sight of 
enemy personnel would be prohibited. 
Mines36, booby-traps37 and other devices38 are regulated by Protocol II39 
and Amended Protocol II to the CCW. Anti-personnel mines are prohibit-
                                                                                                                      
33. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, Oct. 
10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 171. 
34. Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, Oct. 13, 1995, 1380 U.N.T.S. 370. 
35. Id., art. 1. Article 4 defines permanent blindness.  
36. “‘Mine’ means a munition placed on, under or near the ground or other surface 
area and designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or 
vehicle.” Amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-
Traps and Other Devices art. 2(1), May 3, 1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 93 [hereinafter CCW 
Amended Protocol II]. 
37. “‘Booby-trap’ means any device or material which is designed, constructed or 
adapted to kill or injure and which functions unexpectedly, when a person disturbs or 
approaches an apparently harmless object or performs an apparently safe act.” Id., art. 
2(4). 
38. “‘Other’ devices means manually emplaced munitions and devices including im-
provised explosive devices designed to kill, injure or damage and which are actuated man-
ually, by remote control or automatically after a lapse of time.” Protocol on Prohibitions 
or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices art. 2(3), Oct. 10, 
1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168 [hereinafter CCW Protocol II]. Note the developed definition of 
the same term for the purposes of Amended Protocol II, namely, “‘Other devices’ means 












ed by the 1997 Ottawa Convention. 40 The references to “exploded” and to 
munition placement in the CCW mine protocols lead to the common sense 
conclusion that a purely cyber weapon cannot be a mine. For similar rea-
sons, a purely cyber weapon cannot be an anti-personnel landmine within 
the meaning of the Ottawa Convention.41  
However, the CCW Protocol II definition of booby-trap refers to “any 
device or material,” notions that would seem to be broad enough potential-
ly to include a cyber device. If a cyber device were, for example, to take the 
form of a kill switch embedded in a piece of malware planted by cyber 
means into the target computer system and which operates unexpectedly 
when a user of the targeted computer system undertakes a usually safe task 
such as switching on the computer, there is the potential for the cyber de-
vice to come within the Protocol II definition of booby-trap.42 The cyber 
device is only capable of being a booby-trap, however, if it is “designed, 
constructed or adapted to kill or injure.” If malware comprising a kill 
switch is designed to disable, say, the electricity supply to facilities that are 
essential to life support, it would be a matter of national interpretation 
whether this amounts to designed, constructed or adapted to kill or injure. 
While death or injury may be the intended second or third order effect of 
such a device, States may take the view that only devices that kill or injure 
as the immediate, or first order effect, come within the Protocol II defini-
tion. A less restrictive view would, however, see certain cyber capabilities as 
coming within the definition of booby-trap, with the result that Articles 3, 
7, 9 to 14 and elements of the Technical Annex to the treaty would apply 
to such cyber weapons.43 Article 7 would specifically prohibit the use of 
such booby-traps in any way associated with the objects listed in paragraph 
(1).44 
                                                                                                                      
signed to kill, injure or damage and which are actuated manually, by remote control or 
automatically after a lapse of time.” CCW Amended Protocol II, art. 2(5). 
39. CCW Protocol II, supra note 38. 
40. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer 
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 17, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211.  
41. Id., art. 2 (defines anti-personnel mines as meaning mines “designed to be explod-
ed” by specified events). 
42. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 9, rule 44. 
43. A similar definition of booby-trap appears in Article 2(2) of CCW Amended Pro-
tocol II. A State party that takes the view that a cyber weapon comes within the definition 
would apply Articles 3, 4 and 6–9.  
44. The listed objects are internationally recognized protected emblems, signs or sig-













The Protocol II definition limits “other devices” to “manually em-
placed munitions and devices.” This would seem to exclude devices that 
are emplaced by remote means, such as by email. If, however, a thumb 
drive bearing the malware were to be manually inserted into the target 
computer system, it would be a matter of national interpretation whether 
this amounts to “manual emplacement” for the purposes of Protocol II 
and Amended Protocol II. It may be reasonable for States to conclude that 
the cyber weapon is distinct from the gadget that is used to transport it, 
and to decide that the thing being manually emplaced is the thumb drive, as 
opposed to the cyber weapon that it contains. Such an approach would 
suggest that a cyber weapon is not capable of being an “other device” for 
the purposes of those treaties.45  
If a State’s use of cyber methods enables it to take control of mine-
fields, booby-traps or “other devices” from an opposing party, it may only 
use such weapons in accordance with the relevant treaty rules to which it is 
subject. If, however, a computer control system associated with a mine-
field, booby-trap or other device were to be transferred into the control of 
another party to the conflict as a result of a cyber operation, it would be a 
matter of interpretation whether that party had a sufficient degree of con-
trol over them for the Protocol II, Amended Protocol II and/or Ottawa 
Convention obligations to arise.  
Where cluster munitions are concerned, a State that is party to the 
Convention on Cluster Munitions46 and which, by cyber means, takes con-
trol of the cluster munitions of an adverse party to the conflict may not use 
such cluster munitions in breach of its own treaty obligations. It must also 
take action to safeguard and destroy them to the extent that its degree of 
control and other factors make it practicable to do so. 
                                                                                                                      
medical equipment, medical supplies or medical transportation; children’s toys or other 
portable objects or products specially designed for the feeding, health, hygiene or clothing 
or education of children; food or drink; kitchen utensils or appliances except in military 
establishments, military locations or military supply depots; objects clearly of a religious 
nature; historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultur-
al or spiritual heritage of peoples; or animals or their carcasses. 
45. The corresponding definition in Article 2(3) of CCW Amended Protocol II is ex-
pressed in similar, but not identical, terms so it would be equally respectable to conclude 
that a cyber weapon is not capable of being an “other device” for the purposes of the 
amended Protocol.  
46. Convention on Cluster Munitions, opened for signature, Dec. 3, 2008, reprinted in 48 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 357 (2008). “Cluster munition” is defined by Article 












The discussion in this section is not intended to be an exhaustive 
treatment of all of the rules of weapons law that may potentially be of rele-
vance in the cyber context. Rather it is intended to illustrate how cyber ac-
tivity may either constitute activity that is covered by a weapons law provi-
sion or may, because of the control being exercised over an adverse party’s 
weapon, give rise to weapons law responsibilities that may not have been 
foreseen. 
 
IV. WEAPONS REVIEWS OF CYBER WEAPONS 
 
The determination that certain cyber capabilities constitute weapons leads 
to the inescapable conclusion that they require legal review. While all States 
are legally obliged, as a matter of customary law, to “ensure that the means 
of cyber warfare that they acquire or use comply with the rules of the law 
of armed conflict,”47 Article 36 of AP I requires that  
 
in the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, 
means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obliga-
tion to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circum-
stances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of interna-
tional law applicable to the High Contracting Party.48  
 
The customary law obligation to review new weapons follows from the 
general obligation of States to comply with their weapons law duties.49 
Of the relatively few States that are known to have systems for such re-
view, the UK and U.S. systems, and those in Belgium, Canada, Australia, 
the Netherlands, Norway, France and Sweden, take the form of a generic 
                                                                                                                      
47. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 9, rule 48(a). 
48. Rule 48(b) of the Tallinn Manual applies this treaty rule specifically to cyber means 
and methods of warfare. 
49. Consider the liability, in appropriate circumstances, to pay compensation in the 
event of violations of the law of armed conflict in Article 3 of Convention No. IV Re-
specting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227 and Article 
91 of Additional Protocol I. Consider also International Committee of the Red Cross, A 
Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare, Measures to Implement 
Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977, 88 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 
931, 935 (2006) [hereinafter ICRC Guide]; W. Hays Parks, Conventional Weapons and Weapons 
Reviews, 8 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 55, 57 n.6 (2005). The 
customary law prohibition of weapons of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unneces-














review of the weapon in the light of its intended circumstances of use. The 
review is undertaken before the weapon is released to the armed forces for 
use in armed conflict.50 The AP I, Article 8251 targeting advice to com-
manders that is provided ad hoc with regard to planned attacks is generally 
regarded as distinct from the weapon review. Thus, before a non-cyber 
weapon has been released to the armed forces for employment in combat, 
commanders will know that it has been the subject of legal review and that 
the designed or intended use of it, as determined at the time of procure-
ment, accords with the State’s international law obligations. 
There are, however, characteristics peculiar to cyber weapons that will 
make the giving of weapons law advice at the development or procurement 
stage difficult to achieve. A cyber weapon may at that point be so generic 
in nature that the giving of any meaningful advice as to its compliance with 
international law becomes speculative. The very nature of the weapon as 
discriminate or otherwise, and the nature and extent of the generic injury 
and suffering it will cause, may fundamentally depend on the nature, link-
ages, dependencies and customer base of the target computer system. In 
such circumstances, realistic weapons law advice can only be given when 
those variables are known. This has two obvious consequences. The first is 
that the operational commander contemplating use of such a weapon may 
not know in advance that the weapon will be lawful in the circumstances of 
the use that he intends. The second, consequent on the first, is that the 
lawyer fulfilling the Article 82 duty to advise a commander with respect to 
a planned cyber attack may need to build both weapons law and targeting 
law aspects into his legal advice to the commander. 
The weapons law part of such ad hoc advice to the commander will 
therefore need to consider the context of the attack; the first, second and 
third order effects that the weapon is expected to produce; the collateral 
damage expected to civilian users of the target computer system; and 
whether the nature of the cyber weapon is such as to enable the injury or 
damage to be restricted to the military objective. In such circumstances, it 
is obvious that the weapons law advice and the targeting law advice will 
tend to merge. Even the weapons law assessment of whether the weapon is 
                                                                                                                      
50. See ICRC Guide, supra note 49, at 934. 
51. The High Contracting Parties at all times, and the Parties to the conflict in 
time of armed conflict, shall ensure that legal advisers are available, when neces-
sary, to advise military commanders at the appropriate level on the application of 
the Conventions and [the] Protocol and on the appropriate instruction to be giv-












capable of being used discriminately and in compliance with the superflu-
ous injury/unnecessary suffering principle will be eclipsed by the issue of 
whether the planned attack, taking into account the cyber weapon to be 
used, the circumstances of the target system and of any other nodes liable 
to be affected, will comply with the customary law targeting rules, and for 
States party to AP I, with Articles 48 to 67. While this is appreciated, never-
theless, the ad hoc weapons law issues discussed in this article must also be 
considered, if only to conclude that they have no relevance to the particular 
circumstances. 
Perhaps the safest way forward is for a legal review of all cyber weap-
ons to continue to be undertaken at the weapon development stage. Such 
reviews can be used to inform the concept of use and associated docu-
ments in which the requirement for ad hoc weapons law advice concerning 
particular types of attack can be noted. Advisers to commanders must, 
however, appreciate that when advising on planned cyber attacks, a wider 
range of issues will need to be considered for the reasons set out earlier. 
  
V. APPLYING WEAPONS LAW TO PARTICULAR TYPES OF CYBER WEAPONS 
 
Consideration will now be given to how the weapons law previously dis-
cussed can be applied to particular kinds of cyber tools. For these purpos-
es, on an illustrative basis, the use of botnets to deny the services of a tar-
geted computer system, the planting of a kill switch and masquerade will be 
examined.  
Malware might be used to take control of a number of infected com-
puters that become a virtual network centrally controlled by command and 
control servers. Spam messages are then, for example, sent to the targeted 
computer system, the bandwidth of which is exhausted, thus prompting the 
denial-of-service from the targeted system that was the goal of the cyber 
operation. The malware will cause resources of the infected computers in 
the net, or bots as they are known, to be devoted to the operation so ser-
vices to the customers of those systems may also be affected. However, the 
denial or deterioration of service will only last as long as the botnet is oper-
ated and there will normally be no lasting effect on the targeted system. 
The effect on the targeted computer system will not, therefore, amount to 
“damage” such that the botnet tool will not thereby be rendered a weapon. 
If, however, as an example, the targeted system provides life support ser-
vices that when interrupted will foreseeably cause death or injury, such a 













In conducting that review, the rules of weapons law discussed in this 
article should be applied. The nature and degree of the injuries suffered and 
to be expected as a result of such a cyber attack will determine whether the 
superfluous injury/unnecessary suffering rule has been complied with. 
More problematic may be the prohibition of cyber weapons that are indis-
criminate by nature. It is, however, only death, injury, damage or destruc-
tion to protected persons or objects that should be considered. Inconven-
ience or annoyance caused, for example, by collateral denials-of-service 
from computer systems forming the botnet will not cause the cyber tool to 
be indiscriminate by nature. 
The use of a targeted Trojan to plant a kill switch involves sending cus-
tomized—typically concealed—malware to an unaware individual. That 
individual, by running an apparently safe program or computer file, un-
knowingly infects the receiving computer system with malware comprising 
a kill switch. The malware enables the cyber attacker to take control of the 
target computer system giving him access to all the data stored there. The 
kill switch can, for example, disable operating programs, corrupt data or 
close down the target computer system either in response to a command 
from the cyber attacker or when the authorized operator performs some 
routine operation, such as switching on the computer. When reviewing 
such a cyber tool under weapons law, the superfluous injury/unnecessary 
suffering rule will only need to be considered if the cyber tool, in its in-
tended circumstances of use, is designed or intended to cause injury or 
death. In deciding whether, when used as intended, the cyber tool is indis-
criminate by nature, the designed or intended consequences of activating 
the kill switch will be critical. Similar considerations to those discussed in 
the previous paragraph will arise. If the kill switch is designed or adapted to 
cause death or injury, legal reviewers from states that are party to Protocol 
II and/or Amended Protocol II to the CCW will consider whether, accord-
ing to their State’s interpretation, such a device amounts to a booby-trap 
for the purposes of those treaties. Similarly, if the malware containing the 
kill switch is to be applied to the target computer manually, for example by 
means of a thumb drive, and if the device is designed to kill, to cause injury 
or to damage property, the legal reviewer should consider his State’s under-
standing of the definition of “other device” in Protocol II and Amended 
Protocol II.52 If the kill switch is to be actuated by remote control, for ex-
                                                                                                                      
52. CCW Protocol II supra note 38, art. 2(3) and CCW Amended Protocol II, supra 












ample by a command from the cyber attacker, or if it will activate automat-
ically after a specified time period has elapsed, then the requirements of 
both Protocols concerning “other devices” will potentially apply to the 
cyber weapon. If the kill switch is designed to be actuated by a manual act, 
the provisions of Amended Protocol II relating to “other devices” will po-
tentially apply to the weapon. Here again, much will depend on the relevant 
State’s interpretation of the word “manually.” The author considers that, 
when considered in the context of the Protocols as a whole, “manually” 
implies a degree of physical connection between the actor and the device 
which is likely to be absent in the stated example. This is because, in the 
example, the physical connection is between the actor and the thumb drive, 
not the device as such. 
Masquerade, as a cyber operation, involves the creation of a computer 
system that mimics the targeted computer system. Customers of the target-
ed system are diverted to the masquerade system or site where the visiting 
computer may be infected or where deliberately wrong messages may be 
given. Clearly, such a cyber tool can be used for a variety of deception-
based operations, some of which would be unlawful.53 Cyber capabilities 
used for deception-based operations that do not result in death, injury, 
damage or destruction do not, however, constitute weapons, means or 
methods of warfare. It is only, therefore, when the masquerade operation is 
designed or intended to cause death, injury or damage that the cyber tool 
becomes a cyber weapon requiring legal review. The legal principles pro-
hibiting weapons of a nature to cause superfluous injury/unnecessary suf-
fering or to be indiscriminate will then apply to the masquerade operation. 
Thus, for example, if the lethal, injurious or damaging effects of the mal-
ware cannot be controlled or limited reasonably to military objectives, the 





                                                                                                                      
53. Consider, for example, the AP I prohibition on causing death, injury or capture by 
resort to perfidy (Article 37), the prohibition on making improper use of the distinctive 
emblems (Article 38(1)), the prohibition of unauthorized use of the United Nations em-
blem (Article 38(2)), the prohibition on using flags, emblems or insignia of neutrals (Arti-
cle 39(1)) and the prohibition on using flags, military emblems, insignia or uniforms of 
adverse parties during attacks or in order to shield, favor, protect or impede military oper-













VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
As these illustrations demonstrate, distinctions between the law of weapon-
ry and the law of targeting that have considerable logic when applied to 
traditional kinetic weapons are more difficult to maintain in the cyber con-
text. As an example, the generic cyber capability of using a targeted Trojan 
to plant a kill switch may breach the rule prohibiting indiscriminate weap-
ons—or it may not. Much will depend (i) on the nature and characteristics 
of the chosen targeted computer system; (ii) the customers of the target 
system; (iii) on whether those customers are liable further to spread the 
malware—innocently or otherwise; (iv) on whether the kill switch when 
used against the intended target is designed to cause death, injury or dam-
age; and (v) on numerous other features peculiar to the specific intended 
cyber operation.  
Accordingly, a weapon review of such a generic capability should con-
sider the likely applications of the cyber tool, taking into account what the 
tool is designed to do and how it is designed to do it. The review should 
discuss which potential applications, if any, would breach the weapons law 
rules applicable to that State and should identify whether there are re-
strictions on the lawful use of the cyber tool. It will then be for the legal 
adviser to the operational commander to consider the intended cyber oper-
ation by reference to both weapons law and targeting law norms. 
It is evident from the analysis in this article that a useful focus for fu-
ture research and cyber weapons development would be to enhance the 
ability of a cyber attacker to control and limit the effects of cyber weapons. 
This implies the need to be able to direct the weapon at the intended target, 
to limit its effects to that target and to be able to switch off the damaging 
operations if it ceases to operate as intended. Cyber weapons that lack any 
of these features will not necessarily be unlawful; however, enhancing the 
ability to control—possibly even to reverse—cyber effects would seem to 
be a future, if not a present, priority given ever increasing cyber depend-
ence.  
